

Proposed Commitment

Eliminate a requirement that a 4-wheel drive vehicle be used as a patrol and response vehicle. This reduction would need to be balanced by a commitment to verify that the response strategy to address the design basis threat did not rely on the use of a 4-wheel drive vehicle. This change would eliminate the costs of purchasing and maintaining 4-wheel drive vehicles that are not required for protection against the design basis external threat.

Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan

1. ☐ Yes ☐ No Does this change delete or contradict any regulatory requirement?
2. ☐ Yes ☐ No Would the change decrease the overall level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b) through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?

Rationale: The demonstration of protective strategies that do not require the use of a 4-wheel drive vehicle would confirm the ability of a site's protection strategy to protect the facility against the design basis threat.

3. ☐ Yes ☐ No Does this change any unique site-specific commitments?

Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing unique site-specific security features.

Consider historical reasons why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that counterbalance been changed negatively?)

Attachment 3—Unacceptable 10 CFR 50.54(p) Changes

The following is a listing of 10 CFR 50.54(p) changes that have been proposed or submitted but were determined to decrease the effectiveness of their respective plans. Changes would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis if submitted as noted for amendments or exemptions.

1. A change was submitted that would allow a "designated vehicle" to be stored outside the protected area in an unsecured manner. This change is considered to be decrease in overall effectiveness of the plan and would require an exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4).

2. A change was submitted by which any vehicle entering the protected area that is driven by an individual with unescorted access would not have to be escorted by an armed member of the security force. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4) and specific implementation guidance provided to the staff in SECY 93-326.

3. A change was submitted that would allow materials destined for the protected area to be searched and stored in an unsecured, owner-controlled warehouse. This change is considered a decrease in overall effectiveness of the plan and would require an exemption request since it is

contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(3).

4. A change was submitted that requested that security officers be qualified on other than assigned weapons or "duty" ammunition. The change would be considered a decrease in overall effectiveness of the plan. This change could be submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.

5. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that would eliminate the secondary alarm station. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1).

6. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that would reduce the number of armed responders below the minimum required by the regulation. This change would decrease that overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3).

7. A change was submitted that did not specify which positions within the security organization would be armed or unarmed. As written, the staff had to assume the overall effectiveness of the plan was decreased. The licensee would need to resubmit this change to clarify which positions would be armed to confirm that regulatory requirements were being met.

8. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that would allow visitor escorting to be determined at the licensee's discretion. No specifics were provided regarding how this change was to be implemented. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(6).

9. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that would give an alarm station operator the discretion to determine the need for compensatory measures for failed intrusion detection equipment. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1). Compensatory measures for vital area doors are contained in proposed rulemaking currently being processed by the staff.

10. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that would not require compensatory measures for 72 hours on a vital area door that had only a functional lock. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 73.55(g)(1).

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Brian K. Grimes,

Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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Commonwealth Edison Company, Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Correction to Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 (DD-95-09)

In the Notice beginning on page 28808 in the issue of Friday, June 2, 1995, make the following correction:

On page 28811, Section E. *Potential Threats*, in the second paragraph, the fourth sentence should read:

On a daily basis, the staff evaluates threat-related information to ensure the design basis threat statements in the regulations remain a valid basis for safeguards system design.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Clyde Y. Shiraki,

Project Manager, Project Directorate III-2, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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[Docket No 50-458 (License No. NPF-47)]

Gulf States Utilities Entergy Corporation, Entergy Operations, Inc., (River Bend Station, Unit 1); Order Approving Transfers and Notice of Issuance of License Amendments

I

On November 20, 1985, pursuant to 10 CFR part 50, License No. NPF-47 was issued, under which Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU) is authorized to operate and hold a 70 percent ownership share in River Bend Station, Unit 1 (River Bend), which is located in West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana.

II

In June 1992, GSU and Entergy Corporation (Entergy) entered into an agreement providing for the combination of the businesses of their companies. In accordance with the merger plan, GSU, following the merger, will continue to operate as an electric utility, but as a subsidiary of a new holding company to be named Entergy Corporation, with its electric operations fully intergrated with those of the Entergy System. Upon consummation of the proposed business combination and subject to the receipt of the necessary approvals, Entergy Operations Inc. (EOI), on behalf of the owners, will assume operations and managerial responsibility for River Bend.

III

To implement the business combination, GSU applied to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for two license amendments to license NPF-47, by two letters dated January